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4 May 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Statements on the Heine-Raus Case
REFERENCE: Memorandum, dated 25 April 1966,
to DDCI from Mr. J. Patrick Coyne

In response to Mr. Coyne's request for background on Raus and for information supporting the view that Heine was a KGB agent, we have prepared a reply which is attached herewith together with a proposed memorandum of transmittal from you to Mr. Coyne.

The Raus data presented no special problem but I would like to explain how we prepared the material on Heine. It consists of a basic memorandum which describes the material used in making our counterintelligence analyses and the kinds of persons we called upon to perform these analyses. This memorandum also cites briefly the results of our analyses and our conclusions.

We have coordinated this with the ADDP and the General Counsel.

Chief, SR Division

Attachments

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SOURCES/METHODS/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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FOR OFFICE OF ERNST HEINE

1. Information on HEINE derives from several sources:

a. A debriefing of HEINE conducted in early 1967 by representatives of this Agency in Frankfurt, Germany, shortly after HEINE was repatriated to Germany from a Soviet prison camp, ostensibly as a German national. Soon after his return he walked into the American Embassy in Bonn and attempted to interest American authorities in alleged anti-Soviet Russian resistance organizations in Soviet concentration camps.

b. A debriefing for positive intelligence purposes conducted by Canadian intelligence authorities after HEINE had arrived in Canada in 1957. The Canadian officers did not interrogate HEINE on details of his biography and made no effort at that time to establish bona fides.

c. A translation of a tape recording of part of HEINE's story made with his knowledge by an Estonian emigre.

d. A second Canadian report providing biographic information obtained from HEINE in April 1964.

e. Information on HEINE provided by sources of the Agency.

f. HEINE's 924-page deposition taken in February 1965.

g. The extensive reporting by private investigators employed by RAUS' attorneys, consisting of interviews with approximately 36 individuals of Estonian origin in the United States and Canada who had some personal knowledge of the times and places involved in HEINE's background.

h. Documentary reports pertaining to the World War II period, obtained from official German records.

2. While there are numerous discrepancies in the several versions he has told on various occasions, HEINE's story is essentially as follows:

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Following the Soviet takeover of Estonia in 1940 he was arrested by the Soviets for taking part in anti-Soviet activities. Claiming to be an ethnic German whose parents had just been repatriated to Germany, he was released by the Soviets in April 1941 and allowed to travel to Germany to join his parents. After the Russo-German war broke out in June 1941, he was trained for service in a German battalion and served briefly in the Ukraine. In 1942 he returned to Estonia with the Estonian political police, responsible to the German SD (Security Service). In 1943 he was again sent back to Germany where he was trained at Bad Tolz for service with an Estonian Division of the Waffen SS. In August 1944 he was captured in combat with Soviet forces, sent to a Soviet POW camp in the Urals, and escaped from the camp in March 1945. He was captured again by Soviet authorities and held in a detention camp in Estonia whence he escaped in 1946 to join the Estonian anti-Soviet partisan movement. He was active in the underground movement until captured by the Soviets once more in 1950. While in the underground he made a trip with a false passport to Siberia for the purpose of escorting relatives of members of the underground back to Estonia. After all other members of his partisan band had been captured or killed, he was arrested in 1950 and sentenced to corrective labor for anti-Soviet activity and war crimes, and remained in the Soviet Union, shifting frequently from camp to camp. In late 1955 he was removed from a camp in Kuzmansk and sent to a prison in the town of Solikamsk because of contacts with an "anti-Soviet" Russian resistance group in the camp. After two months in the prison he was sent to a transit camp and then permitted to repatriate to West Germany as a German national in connection with the first wave of German POW repatriations following the establishment of West German-Soviet diplomatic relations in September 1955. He first came to our attention when he walked into the U.S. Embassy in Bonn in late 1956, shortly after his arrival in West Germany.

3. When the cable summary of statements HEINE made at the time reached Washington, the desk officer noted the similarity between his story and that of known EGG agents and recommended a more detailed debriefing. This was done in a series of interviews at Frankfurt which reinforced the earlier impression that HEINE was a EGG agent. No further action was taken in Germany to resolve the case, however, since he departed for Canada suddenly and unexpectedly in the Spring of 1957.

4. HEINE's visits to the United States in 1962-1963 and contacts with the Estonian emigre community were brought to our attention by emigre leaders with whom we were in touch, including Juri RAUS. They expressed the view that his actions and background were suspicious. Accordingly, the material available to the Agency up to that time was subjected to a detailed analysis by counterintelligence officers with extensive experience in Soviet intelligence modus operandi and techniques, some with special area expertise relating to Estonia and the Soviet Union during the period from 1939 to 1955. These officers arrived independently at the conclusion that HEINE was a dispatched agent of State Security (now KGB). Supporting this conclusion were analyses and examinations of the information conducted by Agency officers in conjunction with several contract employees of the Agency who were themselves of Baltic origin and who had intimate knowledge of significant periods and places in HEINE's life story.

5. In early 1965 this analysis was subjected to independent review on the basis of the additional material on HEINE's background which had by that time become available to the Agency, and which we believed to be significant either because of unresolved discrepancies or because the HEINE versions were totally at variance with Soviet practices or conditions obtaining at the time. As part of this review, further analysis was conducted independently by an Agency specialist who was directed to study all available material and to make his report with no reference to any previous analyses or conclusions. This person is a former Soviet counterintelligence officer who has been employed by the Agency since 1949, specializing in interrogation and establishment of bona fides of defectors and analysis of agent legends. By means of skillful legend analysis and interrogation he has successfully broken numerous Soviet and Soviet Bloc agents and provocateurs dispatched to the West ostensibly as defectors and repatriates, and he has succeeded in many cases in obtaining confessions. His thorough and detailed examination of the HEINE biography in its various versions supplied by HEINE at different times and for different purposes confirmed the earlier conclusions.

6. Our analysis of the several versions of UPTON's biography as related by him to several authorities at different times reveals major discrepancies which cannot be

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the result solely of faulty memory, falsification or self-glorification. His account is at variance with facts known to us concerning Soviet reality and Soviet security practices in the relevant time period. Analysis emphasizes the striking similarity of his account with known legends of confessed Soviet agents who were dispatched as defectors, repatriates, escapees and representatives of alleged anti-Soviet resistance movements. In addition, statements from several independent sources contradict significant portions of his story. The principal elements pertinent to this analysis are as follows:

- a. HEINE has given several conflicting versions of the incident which led to his initial arrest by the Soviets in 1940, an incident which he later publicized as evidence of his anti-Communism.
- b. There is little rationale for his parents' repatriation to Germany from Estonia prior to his release in 1941; the main groups of ethnic Germans were repatriated in late 1939 and 1940, and HEINE's parents were not ethnic Germans.
- c. The background for HEINE's release from prison and repatriation to Germany in April 1941 as an ethnic German is insufficient and implausible. HEINE was an Estonian national, by law a Soviet citizen, and allegedly had committed an anti-Soviet act. At that time Soviet security organs in the Baltic were transporting persons of this category to detention camps beyond the Urals.
- d. A source currently available who was in charge of the intelligence Division of the Estonian security police from 1941 to 1944 states that a confessed NKVD agent advised him that HEINE had been recruited by a special branch of the NKVD after his arrest in 1940 for dispatch to Germany as a Soviet agent under cover of a German repatriate.
- e. The veracity of his subsequent reunion with his parents in Germany in May 1941 is contradicted by a source who states that HEINE's parents told him in 1945 that they had not seen their son since his initial imprisonment.
- f. There is a discrepancy between HEINE's account and German records of his police service (July 1941).

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March 1942) since records fail to confirm his transfer to Estonia to serve in the Estonian political police under German SD (Security Service) control in February 1942.

g. Further discrepancy exists between HEINE's version of his subsequent German Army training at Bad Tolz and official German records. Doubt is cast on his Bad Tolz period by statements of Estonians who trained or taught there, who find him unable to identify classmates or teachers. There is no absolute certainty that the individual now in the West is identical with the Erik HEINE of the German records.

h. HEINE has given contradictory and implausible versions of his capture by Soviet forces while serving in combat in the Estonian Division, Waffen SS in August 1944.

i. It is illogical and implausible that HEINE should have been accepted and treated by his Soviet Army captors as a German prisoner since he was an Estonian lieutenant in the Estonian Division. Under Soviet field interrogation practices he could not have concealed his true identity.

j. HEINE's version of his subsequent transfer to a Moscow camp for German officer prisoners and later treatment by NKVD soldiers, who allegedly declared him an enemy of the state on the spot because he was an Estonian in German uniform and thus a traitor, conflict with Soviet practice at the time.

k. His subsequent escape from a Soviet POW camp in the Urals in deep winter and black travel to Leningrad in 1944 is highly improbable under the then existing Soviet security regime.

l. Based on our knowledge of Soviet State security practice, it is highly improbable that the Soviets would have failed to identify him fully after his arrest in Leningrad or during his subsequent detention in a camp near Tallinn.

m. After his escape from the detention camp, his service with the Estonian partisans from 1946 to 1950 cannot be verified since he is the sole survivor of his band.

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source now available who had intimate knowledge of the forest area where HEINE claims to have operated, states that HEINE cannot identify known landmarks and is generally unfamiliar with the area.

a. We have certain knowledge that the Estonian partisan movement was almost totally controlled by Soviet State security organs during this time period.

b. HEINE's account of his black journey by plane, train and steamboat from Estonia to a deportation area in Siberia and return to Estonia with a party of four adults and two children without documentation is incredible under then existing Soviet security practices. When he left the group for a brief period in Moscow during a document control it was most probably to arrange with Soviet state security for safe onward passage.

c. During HEINE's extended absence on this trip, repressive action was taken by the Soviets against his underground group. HEINE has given conflicting versions but admits that a number of them were killed or captured.

d. HEINE has provided two completely contradictory and conflicting versions of the killing of his last remaining partisan comrade by Soviet state security police.

e. HEINE's account of his capture in Tallinn in July 1950 and subsequent lengthy interrogation is implausible and improbable since he could not have revealed his true identity, which he admits he did, and at the same time conceal his four-year service with the partisans. He admits that some of his partisan comrades had earlier been captured alive.

f. HEINE has provided contradictory versions of his subsequent sentencing, appeal and re-sentencing as a German national, all versions conflict with our knowledge of Soviet practice, since he had been fully identified as Herik HEINE, an Estonian, and his Estonian (thus Soviet) nationality had been established.

g. HEINE's account of his subsequent detention in a succession of forced labor camps from 1951 to 1956, with

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frequent transfers and relatively favorable work assignments, fits the known pattern of handling of Soviet security agent informers in camps.

v. HEINE's alleged arrest within a camp for his connection with a Russian resistance movement in 1955 and subsequent removal from the camp to a town prison for interrogation is impossible in his version, but logical as preparation for his dispatch to the West as an agent.

v. The subsequent abrupt discontinuance of the interrogation and his immediate transfer to a transit camp for repatriation to Germany conflicts with knowledge of Soviet practice, and is explainable only as an element of agent dispatch.

w. Since HEINE had been fully identified as an Estonian (Soviet) national, his ultimate repatriation as a German POW is not credible except in terms of cover for agent dispatch to the West.

x. Based on the above, our conclusions were:

a. HEINE was recruited by the Soviets following his arrest in 1940 and dispatched to Germany as a Soviet agent in 1941, just prior to the German attack on the USSR. His repatriation as an ethnic German was arranged by the Soviets as cover for his dispatch to Germany.

b. HEINE served as a Soviet agent during the war, first in the Estonian political police (SD) in Estonia, later as a member of an Estonian unit in the Waffen SS.

c. HEINE's escape from a Soviet POW camp and later escape from a Soviet detention camp in Tallinn were arranged by the Soviets to provide him with credentials for penetrating the Estonian underground. His famous "black" trip to Siberia whence he brought back several Estonians was further arranged to permit the Soviets to conduct mop-up operations against the underground without suspicion attaching to HEINE.

d. His arrest in 1955 and shifts from camp to camp were carried out by the Soviets to permit him to serve as an

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informant, reporting on remnants of the Estonian underground and any links between it and persons serving sentences in the labor camps.

e. His repatriation as a German POW was also arranged by the Soviets as a vehicle for dispatching him to the West with the following primary and secondary missions: to entrap Western intelligence services into contact with and support of fictional or Soviet-sponsored underground resistance movements in Soviet labor camps, or partisan movements in Estonia; alternately, to penetrate the Estonian emigre community abroad, establish the extent and nature of its links with Western intelligence services, and ultimately subvert, disrupt and negate the effectiveness of the Estonian emigre movement.

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